ABSTRACT Recently, the US has joined many European jurisdictions in extending civil marriage to same sex as well as different sex dyads. Many liberals regard this as a development worth entrenching. But a prominent recent liberal challenge to civil marriage claims otherwise. According to this challenge, by defining and conferring civil marriage, the state privileges some relationships over others that serve equally well the important liberal goal of fostering effective liberal citizenship, in violation of a prominent interpretation of the doctrine of state neutrality. Theorists who press this challenge, such as Elizabeth Brake and Tamara Metz, argue that it can be met effectively only by dismantling civil marriage and replacing it with more inclusive state-maintained arrangements. So far, prominent responses to this neutralist challenge to civil marriage have focused on the special value of either the relationships to which civil marriage currently extends, or the special value of civil marriage itself. In this article, I develop an alternative reply to this neutralist challenge to civil marriage, one focusing instead on the special vulnerabilities of some of the liberally valuable relationships to which civil marriage currently extends, amorous caregiving dyads.
In most contemporary liberal democracies, marital status is defined and conferred by the state, and its provisions are enforced by the state. For quite some time, such stateestablished marriage was reserved to different sex dyads in many places. By virtue of the recent US Supreme Court decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, the US has joined many European jurisdictions in extending state-established marriage to same sex as well as different sex dyads. Many liberals regard this as a development worth entrenching. But recent liberal challenges to such marriage (which I shall call civil marriage) imply otherwise.
Both Elizabeth Brake and Tamara Metz have offered liberal rationales for state establishment of arrangements to foster and protect intimate caregiving relationships, and argued that accepting this rationale along with key liberal commitments constrains one to favour dismantling civil marriage. Brake and Metz develop somewhat different arguments for this conclusion, and they make somewhat different recommendations about civil marriage's successor. Nonetheless, in challenging civil marriage, each relies heavily on an appeal to the liberal commitment to state neutrality, at least once we abstract from the details of their particular presentations. 1 The argument goes something like this. Liberals are committed to state neutrality, the doctrine that the state ought to be remain neutral in dealing with competing conceptions of the good life. State neutrality is itself a contested notion, but Brake and Metz both appeal to formulations that forbid the state's intentionally privileging any particular contested conception(s) of the good life over any others. 2 One implication of state neutrality, so understood, is that when differing relationships favoured by competing conceptions of the good life serve similarly the same important liberal goal(s), the state ought not act so as to privilege some of these relationships over others. On the views of both Brake and Metz, different conceptions of the good life favour marital and non-marital intimate caregiving relationships, yet all such relationships serve similarly the important liberal goal of fostering and maintaining the capacities required for effective liberal citizenship. In defining and conferring marital status alone, the state acts to privilege marital over non-marital intimate caregiving relationships, in violation of state neutrality. Thus, anyone committed to state neutrality ought to favour dismantling civil marriage in favour of state-established arrangements that support equally all intimate caregiving relationships. In this article, I will take up this neutralist challenge to civil marriage. I will argue that we can accept the relevant doctrine of state neutrality and challengers' claims about what rationalises a liberal state's support of intimate caregiving relationships while yet favouring civil marriage as a means of fostering different sex and same sex dyadic amorous caregiving relationships.
Extant Liberal Defences of Civil Marriage
I am not the first to attempt something like this. Christopher Bennett argues that for individuals to become and remain autonomous, the details of their lives must be accepted, affirmed, and granted importance by another person, one other person who does not do the same sorts of things for others. 3 As Bennett would have it, only civil marriage can foster the sorts of relationships in which such autonomy-enhancing activity can occur, dyadic amorous relationships. Thus, on Bennett's view, civil marriage is justified by appeal to the alleged efficacy of marital relationships at advancing individual autonomy.
More recently, Simon Cabulea May has developed a conditional liberal defence of civil marriage that appeals to its presumptive permanence. 4 On May's view, under certain conditions, marriage's presumptive permanence amplifies many of the benefits accruing from intimate relationships, both to participants and to third parties. State establishment of marriage likely makes it more common than it would otherwise be. Thus, according to May, civil marriage is conditionally justified by its contribution to advancing the important liberal goal of promoting individual flourishing.
Also quite recently, Ralph Wedgwood has updated an older argument of his own so as to defend civil marriage from the charge that it is illiberal. 5 On Wedgwood's view, participation in civil marriage enables many individuals to satisfy a central portion of their most fundamental goals and aspirations. Given the further claims that civil marriage in itself causes no harms and that it is consistent with justice, it is justified by its capacity to advance the common good by enabling many individuals to advance their life plans.
Bennett's and May's responses to the neutralist challenge at issue are structurally similar. Both assert that there is something especially liberally valuable about the sorts of relationships fostered by civil marriage, then appeal to this value to justify such marriage. Wedgwood's response is different; what is liberally valuable about civil marriage is not the sorts of relationships that it fosters, but rather the way that it fits into the most fundamental goals and aspirations of many. In this article, I will develop a response to the neutralist challenge to civil marriage that is distinct from these three responses. I do not think that the relationships fostered by civil marriage are especially liberally valuable, or do anything special to advance many people's most fundamental goals and aspirations. Rather, I regard the sorts of relationships fostered by civil marriage as especially vulnerable, and seek to meet the neutralist challenge at issue by appealing to civil marriage's capacity to assuage these special vulnerabilities and embedding it in an appropriate state-established status pluralism. This response to the neutralist challenge to civil marriage is compatible with the responses offered by Bennett, May, and Wedgwood. And as it appeals to different premises than these other responses, it may speak to somewhat different audiences than they do.
Civil Marriage
As a preliminary matter, I should say something about what I mean by 'civil marriage', more particularly, what I mean when I say things like 'the liberal state should preserve civil marriage status'. The primary mechanism used by the state to maintain civil marriage is the law, of course. But as Elizabeth Brake notes, citing a 2004 letter accompanying a report from the General Accounting Office, in US federal law, there are over 1138 provisions in which marital status figures into the distribution of rights, privileges, and benefits. 6 In addition to these federal provisions, there are numerous state laws that structure such things as property ownership and divorce, and many of these provisions vary between states. Consequently, the proposal to preserve civil marriage status is ambiguous.
To begin to disambiguate this proposal, I will follow Brake in categorising the legal provisions (federal and state) structuring civil marriage roughly by function. 7 In the first category are provisions that link spouses financially. In what follows, I shall call these Category 1 provisions. Examples of such are laws that structure tax obligations of married persons, property ownership by married persons, and acquisition and retention of health insurance by married persons. Category 2 provisions facilitate the maintenance of a personal relationship between spouses. Examples include laws extending special immigration status to spouses, laws extending special tuition rates to spouses, laws enabling spouses to make decisions for one another in cases of incapacity, and protections against loss of consortium. And Category 3 provisions enable entry into marriage and impede dissolution of the relationship between spouses. Examples include the requirement that marriage begin with the granting of a marriage certificate and end with a decree of divorce, conditions imposed on the granting of marriage certificates and decrees of divorce, and protections for the material interests of spouses upon divorce. This taxonomy of legal provisions governing civil marriage is only partial, and the examples of provisions in each of the above 3 categories are meant to be representative, not exhaustive.
When I talk of preserving civil marriage status, I have in mind retaining the sorts of provisions mentioned as examples in all 3 of the above categories. By means of this move, I do not mean to imply a limitation on the sorts of marital provisions that the liberal state has sufficient reason to preserve. I intend only to generate a working understanding of one possible alternative to disestablishment of civil marriage. This working understanding of the proposal to preserve civil marriage is incomplete; there are liberally useful legal provisions of currently established civil marriage that it leaves out. And it is vague, as it does not go into much detail on the content of legal provisions that it invokes. But such incompleteness and vagueness are acceptable in the context of an attempt to offer a philosophical justification of preserving civil marriage. 9 Filling in the details of this proposal within the pluralistic set of legal statuses for supporting liberally valuable and vulnerable intimate caregiving relationships that I shall outline below (from here onwards, intimate caregiving status pluralism) should happen in the transition to practice, as many of these details are appropriately conditioned by social and political factors that cannot be antecedently predicted or fixed.
Intimate Caregiving Unions
Central to the neutralist challenge to civil marriage is a kind of relationship, in Brake's terms a relationship of intimate care, and in Metz's, an intimate caregiving union. Both authors are concerned with the same sorts of relationships, though neither characterises such relationships precisely. By drawing upon the relevant remarks of both, however, we can arrive at a working characterisation of such relationships.
Intimate caregiving relationships can and often do involve material caregiving, such as feeding, dressing, grooming, and communicating with another about the details of daily life. But paid caregiving relationships can involve the same. Both Brake and Metz stress that intimate caregiving relationships are characterised by something other than the provision of material care.
10 And indeed, the two largely converge on what is required to render a caregiving relationship an intimate caregiving relationship.
First, such relationships involve individuals who, sharing a history, know one another intimately and are bound together by non-contractual ties of various sorts: physical, emotional, or moral. Second, such relationships are characterised by what Brake calls attitudinal care. Parties to such relationships take an interest in one another as persons, and are moved by this interest primarily rather than by an interest in their own material gain. And third, as a consequence of these first two features, such relationships do not typically involve a strictly reciprocal exchange of commensurable material goods. Instead, they tend to exhibit an exchange of diverse and incommensurable goods, the flow of which tracks the relative needs and requirements of participants rather than norms of reciprocity or fair exchange.
In defending liberal state support of such relationships of intimate care, both Brake and Metz argue that most of the care required for survival and nurturance of vulnerable human beings happens in intimate caregiving relationships, at least within contemporary liberal societies. Absent the caregiving provided within such relationships, children would not develop into socially functional adults and the sick and elderly would have dramatically reduced life expectancies. Survival and social functionality are, of course, preconditions of effective liberal citizenship.
Both Brake and Metz argue further that intimate caregiving relationships enable the development of more specific capacities required for effective liberal citizenship. Both endorse the Rawlsian idea that effective liberal citizenship requires development and exercise of two moral powers, the power to form, revise, and pursue a conception of the good life and the power to form, maintain, and exercise a conception of justice.
Echoing John Stuart Mill, Metz argues that intimate caregiving relationships provide individuals with privacy and protection sufficient to enable them to refine their conceptions of the good through experimentation. And both Brake and Metz argue that the microcosm constituted by an intimate caregiving relationship presents participants with the sorts of choices required for developing and maintaining a sense of justice.
Thus, there is a plausible liberal rationale for state support of intimate caregiving relationships. Such relationships are required to enable individuals to become and remain effective liberal citizens, at least under anything like current conditions. Although this rationale is open to various objections, I need not defend it here, for I am here exploring some of the consequences of accepting it for committed liberals.
Amorous Caregiving Dyads
Central to my response to the neutralist challenge to civil marriage is a subset of intimate caregiving relationships, the subset comprised of paired intimate caregivers who erotically love one another. For convenience, let us call these amorous caregiving dyads. There is a difficulty involved in characterising such relationships, one generated by persistent and significant controversy about how best to understand erotic love. Plato's version of Aristophanes understands erotic love as a desire for complete union with another. 12 Andreas Capellanus sees such love as a form of suffering caused by the sight of, and undue meditation upon, the beauty of some member of the opposite sex. 13 And on Helen Fisher's account of erotic love, it is a brain system evolved to enable successful mating.
14 These divergent understandings of love have the same goal, to illuminate a widely discussed interpersonal phenomenon. And among those who have sought to illuminate love, across times and disciplines, there is significant convergence on the symptoms distinguishing dyadic erotic love from other interpersonal phenomena.
In Plato's Symposium, Aristophanes advances the claim that love is a yearning to merge with another, to become a single, more complete whole. The claim that love is such a yearning is controversial. I shall assume instead the more widely accepted claim that dyadic erotic love exhibits such a yearning as a symptom. More specifically, I shall suppose that dyadic lovers evince a persisting, strong desire for bodily closeness with the beloved, for sharing experiences with him or her, and for conjoining the agency of lover and beloved by such means as adopting and executing shared plans. 15 A second symptom of dyadic erotic love is the yearning that union with the beloved last. This is, of course, different from the more controversial claim that such a union must last to be love. Different theorists disagree about how lasting one must desire a union to be for this desire to count as a symptom of love. But it seems like a fairly fixed point that someone who desires a union with a definite terminus (the end of the night, the end of vacation, the end of the semester) does not love. Accordingly, I shall take it that to count as loving, a member of a dyadic union must have a persisting, strong desire that it continue into the indefinite future, at least provided that neither of its members change dramatically.
A third symptom of dyadic erotic love is the yearning that the person with whom one desires union reciprocate this desire. An individual desiring union with another, but not desiring the reciprocation of this desire, would be better described as in the grip of a crush or perhaps an obsession.
The yearning for a union that is at least somewhat exclusive is a fourth symptom of dyadic erotic love. Different thinkers about love converge in recognising this symptom, although there is disagreement about how exclusive lovers must desire their unions to be. One option is the extreme claim that lovers must desire union with one another only. But most of us recognise the possibility of love triangles. And some of us admit the possibility of polyamory, at least if the number of participants stays low enough. Hence, it is more plausible to claim that dyadic erotic lovers have a persisting, strong, desire for union with a limited number of others, no more than several at any given time.
A fifth symptom of dyadic erotic love is a yearning on the part of lovers to be regarded as especially important by their beloveds. 16 Sometimes, this is put in terms of non-fungibility; lovers desire to be for their beloveds someone for whom no substitute would be acceptable. Countless Valentine's Day cards pander to this desire ('You're special!'; 'You're the one!'). We find it in high literature as well ('But soft! What light through yonder window breaks? It is the east, and Juliet is the sun'). 17 But probably, the requirement of strict non-fungibility is too strong. It seems possible for a lover to settle for someone (when his or her first choice is unattainable) and still love the person for whom he or she has settled (even while remaining open to a substitution were his or her first choice to become available). Hence, it is more plausible to think that dyadic erotic lovers yearn to be regarded as especially important to, if not irreplaceable by, their beloveds.
By appealing to these five symptoms of dyadic erotic love, we can characterise amorous caregiving dyads. In her well-known study of the brain activity of lovers engaged in focusing on their beloveds, Helen Fisher characterised lovers as individuals exhibiting to a high degree the preponderance of 25 widely recognised symptoms of erotic love.
18 Adapting Fisher's strategy to my purposes here, I shall characterise amorous caregiving dyads as paired members of an intimate caregiving relationship both of whom exhibit to a high degree all 5 of the above symptoms of erotic love.
One might worry that this characterisation of amorous caregiving dyads is underinclusive. More particularly, one might worry that yearnings for union, constancy, reciprocity, exclusivity, and special importance characterise novel, immature love relationships rather than developed, mature ones. 19 Fisher herself distinguishes between erotic love (which she thinks tends to have a lifespan of several years only in humans) and attachment (which erotic love can evolve into and which can last for many years). 20 The five yearnings I have focused on are characteristic of erotic love, but not necessarily attachment, which Fisher characterises as involving deep affection, feelings of security and comfort, and feelings of companionship and friendship. Arguably, pairs of individuals attached in Fisher's sense engaged in intimate caregiving constitute amorous caregiving dyads. And yet, one might think, the characterisation of such dyads I have provided does not encompass such pairs of individuals.
I take it that 'novel, immature' love relationships and 'developed, mature' love relationships can involve individuals across a wide range of ages, that these descriptors refer to the age of relationships and not the ages of the individuals in a relationship. I am sceptical of the claim that individuals in developed, mature relationships will generally lack the 5 destabilising yearnings discussed above. Even individuals in developed, mature erotic love relationships are, I believe, apt to crave union, constancy, reciprocity, exclusivity, and special importance. If I am wrong about this, then perhaps we should take a cue from Fisher and distinguish between amorous caregiving dyads and attached caregiving dyads. And if the latter turned out to have significantly different vulnerabilities than the former, it might well make sense to design and deploy a different status than civil marriage to protect them within the context of the intimate caregiving status pluralism outlined below.
As a practical matter, one might wonder how the liberal state should go about identifying amorous caregiving dyads to determine eligibility for civil marriage status. Given that amorous caregiving relationships are a subset of intimate caregiving relationships, there are 2 distinct challenges here.
The first challenge is separating out relationships of intimate care from other kinds of relationships. There are, of course, many ways of attempting this, ranging from selfidentification to the sort in depth scrutiny to which newly-married applicants for preferred immigration status are sometimes subjected in the United States. I prefer to leave the question of how the state should identify intimate caregiving relationships open, to be settled in practice by balancing considerations like incentives for abuse, incidence of abuse, costs and benefits of scrutiny, costs and benefits of excluding relationships that do not qualify from state support, and so on. Both Brake and Metz also face the challenge of determining how the state should identify intimate caregiving relationships for conferring some set of benefits and protections. All parties to the current debate face similar cost/benefit trade-offs in meeting this challenge.
The second challenge is determining which intimate caregiving relationships are also erotic love relationships. Here there is little to be lost and something to be gained by allowing intimate caregiving pairs to assess for themselves whether they exhibit love's five characteristic features and then self-identify as lovers, or not, as they wish.
Allowing paired intimate caregivers to self-identify as amorous caregiving dyads does not expose the state to any increased risk of protecting liberally undesirable relationships, as whatever measures the state has settled upon to separate intimate caregiving relationships from other relationships have already done their work. All the state stands to lose by using self-identification as lovers to qualify paired intimate caregivers for civil marriage is lessened protection for such pairs if they end up choosing a status less protective of their relationship than other alternatives within the intimate caregiving status pluralism outlined below. And the state enhances individual autonomy slightly by means of this approach. If some intimate caregiving pairs are so attached to civil marriage that they are willing to choose it despite the availability of statuses that would be even better at protecting their relationships, it leaves them this option.
One might think that the liberal state would serve intimate caregivers best by scrapping civil marriage in favour of a general mechanism for supporting intimate caregiving relationships. Showing that this is not so involves two substantive tasks. The first is to provide a plausible liberal rationale for preserving civil marriage status. The second is to argue that contra Brake and Metz, the state can preserve civil marriage, at least within the context of the intimate caregiving status pluralism outlined below, without falling afoul of state neutrality.
A Liberal Rationale for Civil Marriage
There are alternatives to marriage that might be deployed within a liberal state to support amorous caregiving dyads. For instance, a liberal state might turn marriage entirely over to social or religious groups. Or the state might design and sustain a framework for the making and enforcing of 'bespoke relationship contracts', individually tailored contracts laying out the terms on which particular dyadic amorous caregiving relationships will be conducted. 21 There are other possibilities as well. It might be that one of these alternatives does as well or better than civil marriage at shoring up amorous caregiving relationships in a liberally respectable way.
Manifestly, social, political, and economic institutions can be less than the best at their intended purpose and still be liberally justified. At least some of the time, this is because institutions of these sorts can affect the realisation of multiple liberal values in different ways, some of which may count for more from a liberal perspective than an institution's optimality in fulfilling its intended purpose. This is especially likely in the case of an institution intended to support amorous caregiving dyads. And so, civil marriage might turn out to be no better than, or even worse than, liberally respectable alternatives for supporting amorous caregiving dyads and still be consistent with major liberal values, including state neutrality.
Were I seeking to show that all things considered, liberal states should preserve civil marriage to support amorous caregiving dyads, I would need to explore alternatives for supporting such relationships. But in the context of my present effort to answer the neutralist challenge to civil marriage, such an exploration would just introduce considerable unneeded complexity. I shall, accordingly, set aside alternatives to civil marriage for supporting amorous caregiving dyads in what follows.
To provide a liberal rationale for preserving civil marriage, I shall appeal to the above five symptoms of erotic love. All are yearnings, desires with a tendency to persist that have significant motivational force. Unsatisfied yearnings of all sorts tend to produce unpleasant and disvalued psychic effects in the person yearning, effects with the potential to disrupt this person's relationships. If I yearn for a career change, for instance, then my discontent with my current occupation, my worry about my inability to change it, and my frustration when my attempts at changing it are stymied will tend to put pressure on all of my relationships. Unsatisfied yearnings for union, constancy, reciprocity, exclusivity, and special meaning tend to put pressure on the dyadic love relationships they target, disrupting these relationships. Thus, unalleviated, the five symptoms of erotic love threaten the persistence of the amorous caregiving relationships in which they manifest, rendering them vulnerable in ways that other intimate caregiving relationships are not. In what follows, I shall argue that civil marriage can help amorous caregiving dyads to persist when they might otherwise not have by compensating for these vulnerabilities. 22 The idea that different sex relationships of intimate care render women participants especially vulnerable is familiar from the work of many feminists. Within such relationships, women frequently subjugate their own prospects to the prospects of their partners or children, becoming financially and/or emotionally dependent on their partners in the process. This can render women vulnerable in ways that violate widely-accepted norms of fairness or justice.
Here I am mobilising quite a different understanding of vulnerability, one in which relationships are rendered vulnerable rather than individuals, and these relationships are rendered vulnerable by unsatisfied yearnings of participants in these relationships. Unlike women's vulnerability within different sex relationships, such vulnerability does not violate widely-accepted norms of fairness or justice. Rather, as I shall argue, helping the members of amorous caregiving dyads to alleviate their yearnings for union, constancy, reciprocity, exclusivity, and special importance has significant instrumental value to the liberal state.
One way to alleviate such yearnings is to satisfy them. The relevant sort of satisfaction is psychological. A yearning is satisfied insofar as the person yearning experiences its pangs less intensely, rendering them less disruptive. The most straightforward way to satisfy a yearning is to provide the person yearning with what is yearned for, but there are other ways to alleviate a yearning's pangs. One might, for instance, provide the person yearning with evidence that he or she is making progress towards attaining that for which he or she yearns, or that he or she has attained it partially. Civil marriage can help to satisfy dyadic lovers' yearnings for union, constancy, reciprocity, exclusivity, and special importance primarily in the latter two less straightforward ways.
To see this, consider first dyadic lovers' yearning for physical, psychological, and practical union. Civil marriage is perhaps least helpful in satisfying the yearning for bodily closeness. But still, embedded in many contemporary Western legal understandings of marriage is the expectation that spouses will be physically close (consider some of the Category 2 provisions involved in civil marriage, privileged immigration status for spouses, for instance, and protections against loss of consortium). And as a number of theorists have noted, this expectation is embedded in the social understanding of marriage as well. 23 By virtue of this legally and socially embedded expectation, marrying can help to reassure dyadic lovers that they are progressing towards physical union. Marrying contributes as well to satisfying lovers' yearning for psychological union, due to the socially embedded expectation that spouses will engage in shared activities such as marriage ceremonies and shared vacations. And by virtue of some of the Category 1 legal provisions involved in civil marriage, marrying actually conjoins many aspects of the agency of lovers, by enabling them to do such things as pay taxes as a single entity or to jointly own personal property without the need for special legal provisions. We should expect this to satisfy dyadic lovers' yearning for practical union because it both constitutes conjoined agency and sets up a framework in which spouses can reasonably anticipate future conjoined agency. Now consider dyadic lovers' yearning that their union should last. Since this yearning is for an inchoate state of affairs, it is not easy to say when it has been satisfied. But civil marriage can help to satisfy lovers' desire for constancy psychologically by means of Category 3 provisions like the requirement that marriage be ended by a legal decree of divorce and protections for the material interests of divorced spouses. Such provisions create legal and financial impediments to dissolving the sort of union symptomatically desired by members of amorous caregiving dyads. 24 Consider next dyadic lovers' yearning that their beloveds reciprocate their yearning for union. If what I have said so far about the legally and socially embedded expectations of married persons is correct, then entering into a civil marriage with someone is a gesture that can plausibly be interpreted as an expression of a persisting, strong desire to form a union with that person. Cognizance of this gesture can help to psychologically satisfy dyadic lovers' yearning for reciprocity.
And civil marriage can help to satisfy dyadic lovers' yearning for exclusivity as it does their yearning for constancy, by creating impediments to lovers doing things that would tend to frustrate this yearning. All fifty US states include some version of a Category 2 prohibition on bigamy, generating a legal impediment to lovers' conjoining their agency in some of the ways specific to civil marriage with more than one other simultaneously. Given the legally and socially embedded expectation that spouses will not replicate very many aspects of their union with someone else, marrying is a gesture that can help to reassure dyadic lovers that their yearning for exclusivity is being met.
Finally, consider dyadic lovers' yearning to be regarded as especially important to their beloveds. Awareness of some Category 1 provisions involved in marriage can help allay this yearning, given widespread prohibitions on bigamy. If one is married, then one's spouse is the only person with whom one can jointly own property or pay taxes without making special legal provisions. Awareness of Category 2 prohibitions can help as well. Given widespread prohibitions on bigamy, a married person is linked to his or her spouse when it comes to such things as immigration status and tuition status in ways that no other person is. And it is important to note that these claims would not be undermined were the state to implement multiple other kinds of legal statuses to protect other kinds of intimate caregiving relationships, say, as part of the intimate caregiving status pluralism outlined in the next section. An individual's special importance to his or her spouse in the above respects is not diluted by a proliferation of different relationships in which individuals can become special to one another or others in similar ways.
One might be sceptical about the capacity of the legal provisions involved in civil marriage to satisfy some of the yearnings symptomatic of erotic love that I have described. 25 If my lover stays with me because he or she is disinclined to try to overcome the legal impediments involved in leaving, one might think that my yearning for constancy will not be satisfied, because what I yearn for is not just that my lover stay, but that he or she stay for the right reason, motivated by a yearning to be with me. Similar points can be raised with respect to lovers' yearnings for reciprocity, exclusivity, and special importance. If this is right, then legal provisions cannot satisfy many of the yearnings symptomatic of erotic love, because such provisions work by creating motivations in lovers the recognition of which precludes these yearnings being satisfied.
But that the legal provisions involved in marriage operate by creating external motivations for lovers to be constant, to reciprocate love, and so on would only preclude satisfaction of the relevant symptomatic yearnings of erotic love in lovers expecting their partners to be solely and unflaggingly motivated by considerations internal to love.
And this is a high bar to set. Many humans (I am tempted to say virtually all) are susceptible to temptations, powerfully disruptive emotions, perceptual and cognitive lapses, any of which could motivate even someone who loves to act against the demands of constancy, reciprocity, exclusivity, and special importance. One might view the external motivations generated by civil marriage's component legal provisions as a way for lovers to pre-commit themselves to acting in accordance with these demands. And one might view the choice of such pre-commitment by a lover as an effort to protect his or her beloved from the possible consequences of succumbing to future temporary motivational lapses. For those taking such a view of human motivation and marriage, that the legal provisions involved in civil marriage operate by creating motivations external to love is no bar to their redressing the vulnerabilities of amorous caregiving dyads in the way I have described. Thus, the sort of global scepticism under consideration is not plausible. And all that a more restricted scepticism of this sort implies is that civil marriage is not apt to be effective at redressing the symptomatic vulnerabilities of love across all amorous caregiving dyads, in which case affected pairs might avail themselves of other options available within the intimate caregiving status pluralism outlined below.
Parent/child and child/parent relationships are not typically characterised by the involved parties exhibiting to a high degree a yearning for practical union, or a yearning for exclusivity. Intimate caregiving relationships between close friends cohabiting and between members of urban tribes tend to lack the yearning to be regarded as especially important, as well as yearnings for bodily closeness and constancy. Other sorts of intimate caregiving relationships differ from amorous caregiving dyads in similar ways. The cluster of relationship-disrupting features characteristic of amorous dyads is distinctive. Because other intimate caregiving relationships do not typically exhibit the same cluster of vulnerabilities as amorous caregiving dyads to anything like the same extent, a commitment to fostering effective liberal citizens does not support extending civil marriage in support of other intimate caregiving relationships. 26 Indeed, consideration of the conditions required for civil marriage to support amorous caregiving dyads reveals a significant consideration against scrapping such marriage in favour of some more general state-established mechanism for supporting intimate caregiving relationships. In arguing that civil marriage can help to alleviate some of the characteristic and disruptive symptoms of erotic love, I have appealed to the social meaning of such marriage. Disestablishing civil marriage in favour of some more general state-established mechanism for supporting intimate caregiving relationships risks fragmenting this meaning, rendering amorous caregiving dyads more vulnerable to their own internal destabilising tendencies and thus compromising the liberal state's capacity to help individuals become and remain effective liberal citizens.
But as noted by a referee commenting on an earlier version of this article:
What marriage means for an Orthodox Jew or Muslim is very different from what it means for a liberal same-sex couple. What it means for a serially-married celebrity is very different from what it means for an elderly couple who have been married 50+ years. There is already a significant fragmentation of marriage's meaning, not least because there are those for whom same-sex marriage is not real marriage, and those for who [sic] it most certainly is.
27
Appealing to these observations, one might argue that the social meaning of marriage has already fragmented, precluding any appeal to it to rationalise the preservation of civil marriage.
The social meaning of marriage has surely fragmented in the ways suggested by the above comment, even under civil marriage. But fragmentation is a matter of degree, and my argument requires only that the social meaning of marriage has not fragmented so much as to prevent it from functioning as described above. I believe this to be the case, but as far as I can tell, there is no good empirical data on the present state of the fragmentation of marriage's social meaning. For the sake of argument, I shall assume that the social meaning of marriage has not fragmented so much as to prevent it from functioning as described above. I regard the cost of conditioning my argument on this assumption as acceptable. If the social meaning of marriage has already fragmented past the point indicated, all that follows is that a liberal state might have to take measures to (re-)establish the requisite sort of social meaning for marriage to bring civil marriage into line with requirements of state neutrality (as well as embedding civil marriage in intimate caregiving status pluralism outlined below).
Cumulatively, these observations suggest that civil marriage, maintained as a distinct status, can help to compensate for the peculiar vulnerabilities of a subset of relationships participation in which tends to help individuals become and remain effective liberal citizens. And if this is right, then the liberal state's interest in fostering effective liberal citizenship provides a rationale for its continuing to preserve civil marriage rather than scrapping it in favour of a general mechanism for supporting intimate caregiving relationships. Of course, the liberal state is supposed to pursue this interest without running afoul of other key liberal commitments, like the commitment to state neutrality. To show that civil marriage is liberally respectable, we must take up this issue. But first, let us consider a few objections to the rationale developed above for preserving civil marriage.
As background for a first objection to the above rationale for preserving civil marriage, consider that the very symptoms that I have used to mark amorous caregiving dyads off from other relationships of intimate care render them vulnerable. Erotic lovers yearn for such things as union and permanence, but these very yearnings threaten the persistence of their relationships. One might claim that to exhibit yearnings that threaten the realisation of the very states of affairs being yearned for is both delusional and self-sabotaging. And one might claim that delusional and self-sabotaging yearnings are proper candidates for therapeutic intervention, not material support. Appealing to these claims, one might object to the above rationale for preserving civil marriage on grounds that the liberal state ought not to support delusional and selfsatisfying yearnings in its citizens. 28 It seems right that as I have characterised amorous caregiving dyads, they are inherently vulnerable. But the yearnings rendering such relationships vulnerable only tend to destabilise them; these yearnings do not assure their eventual destruction. Thus, erotic lovers need not be either delusional or self-sabotaging. Blithely optimistic lovers might fit this description; other lovers can yearn for such things as union and permanence in full awareness that the odds are against them.
A more apt characterisation of amorous caregiving dyads, given their inherent vulnerability, might be that they are constitutionally fragile. 29 One might resurrect the above objection by claiming that the liberal state ought not to rely on something fragile in its very makeup to discharge a task as important as fostering effective liberal citizenship. But that something is constitutionally fragile does not render it unreliable for discharging important tasks, at least not if there are effective measures that can be taken to offset its fragility. Glass, for instance, is constitutionally fragile. And yet suitably reinforced, it is used in automotive windshields to discharge the important task of protecting drivers and passengers from wind, weather, debris, and injury from rollovers. By the same token, the constitutional fragility of amorous caregiving dyads is not enough to render them unreliable for discharging the important task of fostering effective liberal citizenship, at least not if there are effective measures that can be taken to offset their fragility. And I have argued that preserving civil marriage is just such a measure. So the inherent vulnerability of amorous caregiving dyads fails to ground a convincing objection to the above rationale for preserving civil marriage.
Of course, if amorous caregiving relationships reinforced by marriage were not as good as other relationships of intimate care at fostering effective liberal citizenship, the above reply would be unconvincing. And given the intense focus of erotic lovers on one another (as evidenced by the content of their characteristic yearnings), one might think that fostering effective liberal citizenship (especially a degree of impartiality, as presumably required by a developed sense of justice) would be better accomplished by individuals investing less of their time into amorous caregiving dyads and more into other sorts of intimate caregiving relationships. 30 Appealing to this possibility, one might object to the above rationale preserving civil marriage on grounds that the liberal state could pursue its interest in fostering liberal citizenship more effectively by replacing marriage with a general mechanism for protecting intimate caregiving relationships.
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I am sceptical of the claim that amorous caregiving dyads would do less well in general than other sorts of intimate caregiving relationships at fostering impartiality. It is not clear, for instance, that parents focus any less intensely on their children than lovers do upon one another, even if the characteristic yearnings involved in parenthood differ from those involved in erotic love. And besides, one might think that being consistently impartial requires individuals to be able to deliberately bracket the things and people they focus upon intently. Were this so, the yearnings characteristic of erotic love would be a help in fostering impartiality rather than a hindrance.
But in any case, whether some varieties of intimate caregiving relationship are better or worse at fostering effective liberal citizenship is ultimately an empirical question. And as far as I can tell, it is not one that has yet been studied empirically. Absent data showing that amorous caregiving dyads are worse than other intimate caregiving relationships at fostering effective liberal citizenship, the current objection just gestures towards a research program with the potential to undermine the above rationale for preserving civil marriage.
Suppose it turned out that amorous caregiving dyads were not as good as some other intimate caregiving relationships at fostering effective citizenship. Given the Brake/Metz account of how intimate caregiving relationships foster effective liberal citizenship, liberal states would yet have reason to continue sustaining amorous caregiving dyads, even while trying to better support other sorts of intimate caregiving relationships in hopes that they might prove even better than civil marriage at fostering effective liberal citizenship. Doing so would be a wise form of bet hedging.
Besides, even setting aside the controversial claim that the tendency to form dyadic erotic love relationships has an implastic biological basis, this tendency seems deeply entrenched in the contemporary United States and in many other contemporary societies. Many people aspire to form amorous caregiving dyads, invest great time and energy in the effort to do so, and structure their lives around this effort. Given that the tendency to form amorous caregiving dyads is deeply entrenched, people are unlikely to simply cease trying to form such pairings in large numbers and gravitate to other forms of intimate caregiving relationships if the state stops shoring up amorous caregiving dyads. Likely, many will keep trying to form such pairings in the absence of the support provided by civil marriage. And if the argument of this article so far is correct, they will do so with significantly reduced prospects of success, at the expense of the liberal state's ability to foster effective liberal citizens.
From these considerations, it follows that the liberal state's legitimate interest in fostering effective liberal citizens would provide a rationale for preserving civil marriage even if amorous caregiving dyads turned out to be no more effective (or even less effective) than other intimate caregiving relationships at fulfilling this interest. This rationale is, of course, dependent on amorous caregiving dyads remaining deeply entrenched among us. But I am comfortable with this dependence, both because I expect that amorous caregiving dyads will continue to remain deeply entrenched among us and because were this to change, I believe the case for preserving civil marriage would need to be revisited.
Civil Marriage and State Neutrality
Even granting the plausibility of the above rationale for civil marriage, the liberal respectability of such marriage would not follow without further argument. In particular, it remains to resist the argument that preserving civil marriage falls afoul of state neutrality.
One might think that the above rationale puts civil marriage in fairly obvious conflict with state neutrality. 32 For at various points, this rationale appeals to civil marriage's potent expressive capacity, its ability to enable married individuals to convey to others important particulars about the kind of relationship they have with another with little effort or risk of misunderstanding. 33 Under civil marriage, members of amorous caregiving dyads can avail themselves of this resource while members of other sorts of intimate caregiving relationships cannot. Given the plausible assumption that access to this expressive resource advantages individuals in pursuing their conceptions of the good, civil marriage would seem to privilege pursuit of some conceptions of the good over others, in violation of state neutrality.
But in addressing the neutralist challenge raised by Brake and Metz, I have assumed their formulation of neutrality, which forbids only the state's intentionally privileging any contested conception of the good. If a state maintains civil marriage with the intention of helping to foster effective liberal citizenship, and it turns out that some intimate caregiving relationships benefit in ways that others do not as a consequence, there is no conflict with the formulation of neutrality with which all parties to the present discussion are operating.
There is a less obvious way that the above rationale for civil marriage puts such marriage in conflict with state neutrality. One might think that the vulnerabilities of amorous caregiving dyads we have identified are not unique to such relationships. Asserting that these vulnerabilities are widely and evidently shared with other sorts of intimate caregiving relationships, one might argue that the liberal state's maintaining civil marriage without doing anything to shore up these other sorts of relationships is a clear violation of the relevant formulation of state neutrality.
Confronted with this argument, one might just insist that the vulnerabilities to which the above rationale appeals are peculiar to amorous caregiving dyads. But it seems likely that intimate caregiving relationships other than amorous caregiving dyads, some amorous triads for instance, exhibit many or even all of the destabilising symptoms of amorous caregiving dyads that civil marriage can help to alleviate. Fortunately, there is a better response to this argument available. Specifically, a liberal state might deploy civil marriage in support of amorous caregiving dyads while simultaneously supporting other kinds of vulnerable intimate caregiving relationships by means of additional state-established statuses customised to ameliorate their particular vulnerabilities. The result would be the intimate caregiving status pluralism to which I have been referring at various points in the discussion up to this point.
Metz mentions a number of intimate caregiving unions that might be supported by particular statuses within this pluralism: parent/child caretaking relationships, child/ parent caretaking relationships, caretaking relationships involving able and disabled siblings, and caretaking relationships involving cohabiting and materially interdependent retirees. 34 Intimate caregiving status pluralism might include as well particular statuses supporting larger amorous groupings, amorous triads, amorous tetrads, and so on. Some of the above intimate caregiving relationships might exhibit vulnerabilities overlapping those of amorous caregiving dyads. Others might exhibit distinct vulnerabilities. Still others might exhibit a mix of overlapping and distinct vulnerabilities. Just which intimate caregiving relationships exhibit vulnerabilities apt to be ameliorated by means of state-established statuses, and just which vulnerabilities that such intimate caregiving relationships exhibit, are empirical matters. This is a vague description of intimate caregiving status pluralism. Present purposes, however, do not require specifying it in more detail. It is an abstract ideal, the instantiation of which would insure that intimate caregiving relationships that serve similarly the important liberal goal of promulgating effective liberal citizenship would be similarly supported by the state. Successful instantiation of this ideal would enable a liberal state to maintain civil marriage in support of amorous caregiving dyads while respecting the liberal commitment to state neutrality.
Objections and Replies
Central to the above case for the liberal respectability of preserving civil marriage is the claim that intimate caregiving status pluralism affords protections to amorous caregiving dyads that general mechanisms for protecting intimate caregiving relationships do not. But both Brake's minimal marriage and Metz's intimate caregiving union status would assign various legal rights, privileges, and protections to the members of amorous caregiving dyads (in their capacities as members of intimate caregiving relationships). As well, when liberal states have broadened their understandings of protected religious belief and practice to include non-theistic systems like Druidism, it is not like people have stopped understanding assertions like 'I am a Christian' or 'I am a Jew'. One might think that the social meaning of 'I am married' would survive similarly unscathed the shift from civil marriage to a general mechanism for protecting intimate caregiving relationships. Appealing to these considerations, one might object to the above case for the liberal respectability of preserving civil marriage on the grounds that intimate caregiving status pluralism would do no more than minimal marriage or a general intimate caregiving relationship status to protect amorous caregiving dyads from their various vulnerabilities.
The reasoning for the claim that the social meaning of marriage is likely to survive unscathed the shift from civil marriage to a general mechanism for protecting intimate caregiving relationships proceeds too quickly. As liberal critics of civil marriage are quick to point out, state establishment of civil marriage supports a very specific set of intimate caregiving relationships, a much narrower set than would be supported by the mechanisms proposed by Brake and Metz. So the best religious analogue to a liberal state's doing away with civil marriage in favour of a more general mechanism for supporting intimate caregiving relationships is not that state's broadening an already pluralistic understanding of religious belief and practice to include non-theistic systems. It is, rather, such a state's moving from support of one specific set of religious beliefs and practices (say those associated with Catholicism) to recognising a plurality of religions without supporting any more than the others.
And the move from state support of a single religion to such religious pluralism might well result in fragmentation of the social meaning of claims like 'I am a Christian'. Under state-supported Catholicism, 'I am a Christian' is apt to be understood as involving beliefs in such things as the Trinity, the divinity of Jesus Christ, and a hell to which heathens, infidels, and heretics are consigned. Contrastingly, where the state recognises a plurality of religions without privileging any over the others, one might hear 'I am a Christian' from, say, a Unitarian Universalist, many of whom abjure beliefs in all three of these things. In a society where Catholics and Unitarian Universalists live alongside one another and are treated equally by the state, 'I am a Christian' can mean quite different things when uttered by different people.
I am not, of course, advocating state support of a single religion to preserve the social meaning of claims like 'I am a Christian'. (Note that the religious analogue to intimate caregiving status pluralism is a state support of a form of religious pluralism.) My point is rather that appeal to the best religious analogue to the state's doing away with civil marriage in favour of a general mechanism for supporting intimate caregiving relationships fails to ground the expectation that the social meaning of marriage would survive such a shift unscathed.
Indeed, insofar as both intimate caregiving status pluralism and general mechanisms for protecting intimate caregiving relationships tend to erode the current widespread assumption that most everyone will or should marry, one might think them equally likely to strip marriage of useful social meaning. 36 But intimate caregiving status pluralism retains civil marriage as a legal status available to a subset of intimate caregivers. In so doing, it preserves as a set legal provisions that function to link spouses financially, to facilitate day-to-day maintenance of the relationship between the spouses, and to make the dissolution of this relationship more difficult (Category 1, 2 and 3 provisions, as described earlier). As generations of reformers (feminist and otherwise) have argued, legal provisions significantly shape social meaning. If this is so, then insofar as it retains as a set legal provisions of the above sort, intimate caregiving status pluralism incorporates a safeguard against marriage's social meaning fragmenting to the point where there is no general understanding of what it means to be married.
Brake's minimal marriage allows individuals to distribute the legal rights, protections, and privileges associated with civil marriage to different individuals. Metz's proposal might not entail dismantling the current legal marital status to the same degree, as she advocates establishing in its place a legal status for intimate caregiving unions, and such a status might incorporate some of the legal rights, protections, and privileges currently reserved to the married. But there is no assurance that all or even very many of the legal provisions defining civil marriage would survive intact on Metz's proposal. Indeed, considering the broad array of intimate caregiving relationships that Metz recognises, it seems unlikely that provisions protecting consortium or prohibiting bigamy would be preserved in any form. Thus, the general mechanisms for protecting intimate caregiving unions proposed by Brake and Metz do not insure preservation of the legal provisions defining civil marriage to the extent that intimate caregiving status pluralism does. Given that these legal provisions help to shape marriage's social meaning, it follows that these mechanisms lack a safeguard incorporated by intimate caregiving status pluralism against complete fragmentation of the social meaning of marriage.
Further, by retaining the legal provisions defining marriage, intimate caregiving status pluralism offers some protections to amorous caregiving dyads from their vulnerabilities that general mechanisms for protecting intimate caregiving relationships cannot replicate. As argued above, some of these legal provisions help to satisfy dyadic lovers' yearning for practical union and special importance by uniting their agency in various ways, some of which cannot be replicated with others. Others create impediments to dyadic lovers' dissolving their unions and to forming similar unions simultaneously with others, helping to satisfy their yearnings for constancy and exclusivity. In addition to satisfying dyadic lovers' yearnings for union, constancy, and exclusivity directly, legal provisions defining civil marriage can also generate expectations that help to satisfy these yearnings indirectly. Because general mechanisms for protecting intimate caregiving relationships do not retain the legal provisions defining civil marriage to the same extent as intimate caregiving status pluralism, they are not apt to do as well as such pluralism at alleviating the potentially destabilising yearnings symptomatic of erotic love in these ways. 37 Thus, by retaining a subset of the legal provisions defining civil marriage (the Category 1, 2 and 3 provisions described earlier), intimate caregiving status pluralism incorporates counters to the destabilising tendencies of amorous caregiving dyads that more general mechanisms for protecting intimate caregiving relationships lack. Consequently, it can alleviate some of the vulnerabilities of amorous caregiving dyads in ways that such mechanisms cannot. And thus, contra the objection at hand, such pluralism does more than such mechanisms to protect amorous caregiving dyads from their characteristic vulnerabilities.
Consider a second objection to the case I have made for the liberal respectability of intimate caregiving status pluralism. As difficult as it can sometimes be to be married, it is likely even more difficult to be in a less widely-recognised relationship of intimate care than an amorous caregiving dyad surrounded by people who are dismissive of this relationship precisely because it is not a marital one. The costs of such dismissiveness to other sorts of intimate caregiving relationship are varied and can be significant. 38 One might object that that by carving out a special niche for marriage in intimate caregiving status pluralism, the state might be perceived as favouring amorous caregiving dyads, stamping other sorts of intimate caregiving relationships as second-class and thereby entrenching or even increasing their vulnerability. One might regard this as a particularly grievous offence given that the state might instead move to a more general mechanism for protecting relationships of intimate care. Such a mechanism could not plausibly be seen as favouring amorous caregiving dyads. It even has the potential to break down the distinction between amorous caregiving dyads and other sorts of intimate caregiving relationships, perhaps enabling such relationships to better flourish and thereby promoting a more open, inclusive, and diverse society.
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I accept that state establishment of only civil marriage has rendered non-marital intimate caregiving relationships more vulnerable than they would otherwise be. Indeed, intimate caregiving status pluralism is motivated by the concern that intimate caregiving relationships other than amorous caregiving dyads might exhibit vulnerabilities of their own that a distinctive state-established status might help to alleviate. But intimate caregiving status pluralism does not carve out a special niche for marriage. Rather, it carves out a whole set of niches, one for each type of intimate caregiving relationship exhibiting a distinctive cluster of vulnerabilities apt to be ameliorated by provision of a state-established status. By so doing, the state places marriage and other vulnerable intimate caregiving relationships on a par with one another. So if we focus on how intimate caregiving status pluralism is structured, it is difficult to see how it threatens to favour any one kind of intimate caregiving relationship over any other. Indeed, because of its structure, intimate caregiving status pluralism has the same potential as more general mechanisms for protecting relationships of intimate care to break down the distinction between amorous caregiving dyads and other such relationships, promising the same salutary social effects.
One might think to press the present objection by pointing to civil marriage's long history of privileging amorous dyads, caregiving and otherwise, a history that seems likely to colour present perceptions. Appealing to this effect, one might argue that even were the state to stamp the component statuses of intimate caregiving status pluralism as equal, people are likely to focus on the state's validation of marriage and overlook its validation of other component statuses, generating the perception that the state is favouring amorous caregiving dyads over other sorts of intimate caregiving relationships.
But projecting people's perceptions is, at best, an uncertain enterprise. Appealing to the colouring of present perceptions by marriage's history, one might just as well argue that people are likely to find the state's validating alternative statuses alongside marriage so striking that they focus on these alternative statuses rather than marriage, generating the perception that the state is elevating these statuses to the same importance as marriage. I cannot see a convincing argument for believing either of these projections over the other. And in any case, the colouring of present perceptions by marriage's history is apt to carry over and influence people's perceptions of the state's implementing any more general status for protecting intimate caregiving relationships as well. Historically, the state's gathering entities that have been treated differently in the past (men and women, for instance, blacks and whites) under the same status (for instance, full citizen) has not insured that the state would treat these entities equally, or even would be perceived as doing so.
If the above arguments succeed, then a liberal state can establish civil marriage without violating state neutrality so long as it does so within the confines of intimate caregiving status pluralism. If such pluralism were itself untenable, then this defence of liberal state establishment of civil marriage would yet fail. So I want to close by considering a third and final objection, one that might be raised against intimate caregiving status pluralism itself.
According to the proliferation objection, a move to intimate caregiving status pluralism would involve a problematic proliferation of state-established legal statuses deployed to protect relationships. When it comes to fostering effective liberal citizenship, it is not clear that amorous caregiving dyads, or caregiving siblings, or mutually supportive widows or widowers have anything on fraternities, sororities, athletic teams, friendships, even relationships with animals. One might object that intimate caregiving pluralism provides no principled means of distinguishing relationships that ought to be established by the liberal state from those that ought not to be. Without some such means, intimate caregiving status pluralism cannot be plausibly translated from theory into practice.
But intimate caregiving status pluralism does offer a principled means of distinguishing relationships that ought and ought not to be established by the liberal state. The test is to ask whether a given intimate caregiving relationship is 1) intimate in the relevant sense, 2) apt to foster or maintain the capacities involved in effective liberal citizenship, and 3) vulnerable in ways that can be redressed by means of a state established legal status. Relationships that exhibit all three of these features ought to be established by the liberal state. Relationships that fail to exhibit one or more of them ought not to be so established.
Even if they exhibit the second and third of the above features, relationships between members of groups like fraternities, sororities, and athletic teams are not, in general, intimate in the relevant sense. While particular members of fraternities, sororities, and athletic teams might have a shared history, intimate knowledge of one another, and deep and abiding physical, emotional, or moral ties, such intimacy does not typically characterise the relationships between members of such groups. This is due not just to their size, but also to how they are constituted. As Brake notes in discussing such groups, '. . . the group, not the particular individuals in it, matters as an entity; this is shown by the fact that the group persists while individuals enter and exit it'. 40 The fungibility of members of fraternities, sororities, and athletic teams, and the consistent turnover of such members over time, tells against their developing the sorts of knowledge, history, and ties constitutive of intimate caregiving relationships.
I can imagine friendships that exhibit all three of the features that would qualify it for state establishment on the above account. Likely many of us have had a few such friendships, friendships that are relevantly intimate, that exercise our capacities for developing and maintaining a conception of the good and a sense of justice, and that are vulnerable in ways that could be redressed by means of a state-established legal status. But I can also imagine friendships that lack one or more of the above three features. For instance, a shared interest in music might lead two people to start going to clubs together regularly to see shows. They might do so a couple of times a month for many years, without their discussions ranging much beyond their shared musical experience. Such a relationship would be a friendship, though it would not be intimate in the relevant sense. Or, as another instance, consider two people who have been geographically separate for many years, but who maintain regular, intellectually rich, emotionally supportive exchanges entirely over social media. Such a relationship would be a friendship, and it would be both relevantly intimate and effective in promulgating the relevant capacities involved in effective liberal citizenship, but it would not be vulnerable in any ways that could be remediated by a state-established legal status.
One might doubt that relationships between people and animals could qualify for state support under intimate caregiving status pluralism. 41 The issue here is not intimacy, for it is not difficult to imagine relationships between humans and animals that exhibit the relevant kinds of history, knowledge, and ties. Nor is vulnerability the issue, for relationships between humans and animals are subject to a wide-range of state-remediable vulnerabilities (some of which are caused by the state itself, such as bars to importing, transporting domestically, and even keeping some kinds of animals). The real issue here is whether relationships with animals can help to foster the particular capacities involved in effective liberal citizenship.
The capacities to form, maintain, and revise a conception of the good and a sense of justice are deliberative, and require individuals to abstract from what they might presently regard as good or just and to evaluate considerations counting for and against their present views of goodness or justice. Relationships with animals do not necessarily or even perhaps typically require those involved in such relationships to engage in such abstraction or evaluation. Thus, many human/animal relationships will fail to qualify for protection under intimate caregiving status pluralism.
But there are surely cases in which relationships between humans and animals can help to foster the capacities involved in effective liberal citizenship. A relationship with an animal or animals might help an individual frame, refine, or revise a conception of the good focused on work with animals, for instance. Or a relationship with an animal or animals might require an individual to frame and try to answer questions about what that animal or those animals might be owed as a matter of fairness or desert. So like friendships, some relationships between humans and animals will qualify for protection under intimate caregiving status pluralism and some will not.
Clearly, when it comes to exhibiting the features required to qualify for protection under intimate caregiving status pluralism, the kinds of relationships we have been discussing are a real mix. But the above discussion suggests that intimate caregiving status pluralism has the resources to separate this mix into those relationships that ought to be supported by a state-established legal status and those that ought not.
And thus, although intimate caregiving status pluralism would involve a proliferation of state-established legal statuses, this proliferation is bounded by the attributes and vulnerabilities of intimate caregiving relationships and by the nature of the liberal state's interest in fostering such relationships. As reflection on friendship suggests, determining the location of these boundaries is apt to be a messy empirical process. But at various times in the past, liberal states have successfully implemented social and legal reforms that required them to draw boundaries based on messy, empirical distinctions. Consider, for example, the social and legal reforms required to bring the United States from a nation with no federal income tax to its current federal tax system. That implementing intimate caregiving status pluralism would involve significant practical challenges is not enough to establish the proliferation objection's assertion that it is impracticable.
In the context of the present discussion, I should also note that dismantling civil marriage in favour of either Brake's or Metz's preferred alternative is unlikely to be less of a tangle than implementing intimate caregiving status pluralism. Whether a liberal state establishes a set of intimate caregiving statuses, a single such status, or a set of separable privileges and rights that can be assigned at the caregiver's discretion, it must still define and police whatever arrangement it establishes. The challenge involved in doing so is to determine just which intimate caregiving relationships ought, liberally speaking, to be supported by state-established arrangements. One might think that this challenge would be easier to meet within arrangements like Metz's, which require only a binary determination: do those before us qualify for intimate caregiving union status or not? But sorting a complex and nuanced phenomenon into one of two classes may or may not be easier than sorting it into multiple different classes, as required in different ways by both intimate caregiving status pluralism and Brake's minimal marriage. After all, the different statuses involved in intimate caregiving status pluralism, and the guidelines for which sorts of intimate caregiving relationships qualify to receive which rights and privileges on minimal marriage, may provide welcome guidance in sorting intimate caregiving relationships into those that ought to be supported by state-established arrangements that those that ought not.
Thus, all parties to the present discussion about whether we ought to retain civil marriage or dismantle it in favour of some state-established alternative face logistical difficulties stemming from the proliferation of types of intimate caregiving relationships that they must accommodate, at least relative to the status quo. And it is uncertain whether any of these arrangements does any better or worse than any other when it comes to mitigating these difficulties. And thus, not only does appeal to the proliferation of statuses for protecting intimate caregiving relationships fail to establish that intimate caregiving status pluralism is impracticable, it fails as well to establish that it is any more difficult to put into practice than Brake's or Metz's competitor proposals for liberal state support of such relationships.
Concluding Remarks
An appeal to state neutrality may well show that civil marriage, as currently implemented, is liberally unjustifiable. But those who claim that this implies that committed liberals must favour disestablishing civil marriage in favour of some more inclusive alternative are mistaken. For as I have argued here, under the right conditions, the state's preserving civil marriage can satisfy a plausible version of state neutrality. These conditions, represented by intimate caregiving status pluralism, are not currently realised, but it is possible to realise them.
To argue that we should acknowledge this possibility, as I have done here, is to open up an interesting and little discussed middle ground in the current dispute between marriage disestablishmentarians and marriage preservers. This is significant because up until now, this dispute has largely taken the form of a debate about which of two incompatible alternatives we should accept (disestablish civil marriage or preserve it). If the argument of this article succeeds, we have more than two options when it comes to dealing with the difficulties that civil marriage poses to liberals, and choosing between these options will require a nuanced consideration of the relative costs and benefits of each. Of course, to make a case for the existence of a middle ground between marriage disestablishmentarians and marriage preservers is not the same as carefully delineating such a middle ground and arguing that we ought to occupy it, a more ambitious undertaking for some other time. 24 This point is not undermined by the availability of no-fault divorce in all US jurisdictions, for two reasons. The first is that something need not be insurmountable or even very hard to surmount to be an impediment, and even no-fault divorce imposes expenditures of time, energy, and money. The second is that no-fault divorce in some jurisdictions, such as the state of Vermont, remains quite onerous. 25 Versions of such scepticism were suggested to me both by an anonymous referee for this journal and by Massimo Renzo. 26 Of course, other intimate caregiving relationships might exhibit the same cluster of vulnerabilities as amorous dyads to a low degree, or a subset of the vulnerabilities of amorous dyads to a high degree. The liberal rationale for state-established civil marriage that I have sketched does not support extending civil marriage to shore up such relationships. But it does support shoring up such relationships by means of other sorts of state-established statuses within the context of the sort of status pluralism developed in the next section, were doing so an effective way to foster the capacities involved in liberal citizenship. 27 This quote is drawn from remarks provided by an anonymous referee for this journal on a previous iteration of this article. 28 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this journal for suggesting this objection to me. 29 This is how Mike Valdman characterised amorous dyads in his comments on an earlier version of this article in developing an objection related to the one under consideration here. 30 Thanks to Mike Valdman for this suggestion about amorous caregiving dyads and impartiality. 31 For the general shape of this objection, I am indebted to an anonymous referee for this journal. 32 Thanks to an anonymous referee for this journal for pressing me to address this potential conflict. 
